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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence by Fair (2002, 2005) and Giordani (2003) shows that a positive
inflation shock with the nominal interest rate held constant has contractionary effects. These
results cannot be reconciled with the standard ‘New Synthesis’ literature. This paper
reconsiders the effects of inflation shocks in a simple New Keynesian framework extended to
include wealth effects. It is shown that, following an inflation shock, the decline of output
coupled with passive interest rate rules is not puzzling.
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The response of the economy to inﬂation shocks has received considerable attention in
the literature. Recent empirical contributions by Fair (2002, 2005) and Giordani (2005)
show that positive inﬂation shocks have contractionary eﬀects on output even when the
nominal interest rate is not increased.1 These results cast doubts on the validity of the
predictions of dynamic New Keynesian models, where increases in inﬂation require a
monetary policy responding with a more than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest
rate (the so-called ‘Taylor principle’), in order to guarantee macroeconomic stability and
equilibrium uniqueness.
The present paper attempts to reconcile this recent empirical evidence with the New
Keynesian literature. The standard ‘New Synthesis’ approach is based on the representa-
tive agent framework with inﬁnite-horizon consumers (e.g., McCallum and Nelson, 1999;
Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 1999; Gal´ ı, 2003; Woodford, 2003), thereby ignoring redistri-
butions of wealth across generations. The is relation is derived from the log-linearization
of the standard Euler equation characterizing the household’s optimal trade-oﬀ between
current consumption and saving. Hence, monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the
economy only through their eﬀects on real interest rates. When ﬁscal solvency is ensured,
equilibrium indeterminacy is ruled out if and only if the Taylor principle applies. This re-
quirement ensures that the real interest rate will be moved upward when inﬂation exceeds
its target, thereby producing contractionary eﬀects on aggregate demand. By contrast,
‘passive’ interest rate rules, underreacting to inﬂation pressures, are destabilizing and
give rise to sunspot ﬂuctuations.
In this paper, we relax the assumption of the immortal representative agent by in-
troducing overlapping generations (olg) ` a la Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) into
a stochastic framework with monopolistic competition and staggered price adjustment.
There are strong reasons for using an olg setup. The framework employed maintains the
main features of the so called ‘New Synthesis’ and encompasses the standard representa-
tive agent paradigm as a special case. Diﬀerently from the standard general equilibrium
framework with a single inﬁnitely lived consumer, olg models are shown to be capable
of generating “liquidity eﬀects” (see B´ enassy, 2006), thereby capturing a well established
empirical feature of the monetary policy transmission mechanism (e.g., Christiano et al.,
1997). As demonstrated by B´ enassy (2006), liquidity eﬀects are produced by intergener-
ational wealth eﬀects. For the latter to be operative in a dynamic optimizing model, it
is necessary and suﬃcient to have a positive birth rate (see Weil, 1989).
Most importantly for our purposes, consistently with the original ﬁndings by B´ enassy
(2000, 2005), passive interest rate rules, including pure interest rate pegs, do not cause
sunspots and equilibrium multiplicities, being compatible with the existence of a deter-
minate rational-expectations equilibrium. This property of the olg setup enables us to
study the eﬀects of inﬂation shocks under both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policies.
Positive inﬂation shocks produce a redistribution of real wealth from current to future
generations. Under these circumstances, the nominal interest rate must not necessarily
be forced to increase more than proportionally with inﬂation to produce contractionary
eﬀects on current aggregate demand and guarantee stability. We show that an inﬂation
shock has negative eﬀects on the time path of output and consequently of inﬂation even
under a ‘passive’ monetary policy rule. Our results thus provide sound micro-foundations
to the empirical ﬁndings by Fair (2002, 2005) and Giordani (2003).
1Fair obtains his results in structural econometric models, while Giordani uses a VAR analysis.
1The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a baseline dynamic New Key-
nesian model extended to incorporate olg. The analysis of equilibrium dynamics under
interest rate feedback rules ` a la Taylor is developed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Consumers
The demand-side of the economy is described by an extended stochastic discrete-time
version of the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) perpetual youth model, where labor supply
decisions are explicitly included. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume a
‘cashless’ economy, according to the standard literature (e.g. Woodford, 2003).2 Private
agents have identical preferences and face the same constant probability of death, γ ∈
(0,1), in each period of time. Population is assumed to be constant over time and the
total size is normalized to one. Individuals are indexed by j ∈ [0,1]. At each date a new
generation of size γ is born and a fraction of equal size of the population passes away.
Since there is no bequest motive and lifetime is uncertain, a life insurance market is
assumed to be operative, as in Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985): competitive insurance
companies collect ﬁnancial wealth from the deceased members of the population and pay
fair premia to survivors. The zero proﬁt condition in the insurance sector implies that
the gross return on the insurance contract, incorporated in the individual ﬂow budget
constraint, is 1/(1 − γ).
The representative agent j of the generation born at time s ≤ 0 maximizes the




[β (1 − γ)]
tU (Cs,t (j),Ns,t (j)), (1)
where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, Cs,t (j) is consumption of the ﬁnal good,
and Ns,t (j) denotes agent’s labor, that is assumed to be supplied under monopolistic
competition.3 In particular, each agent j faces a demand function for her labor services
given by Ns,t (j) = (Ws,t (j)/Wt)
−ηt Nt, where Nt denotes total employment, ηt > 1 is
the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor inputs, allowed to change over
time, Ws,t (j) is the individual nominal wage rate, and Wt =





the aggregate wage index. The ﬂow budget constraint of the representative agent born






(Bs,t (j) + Ws,t (j)Ns,t (j) + Zs,t (j) − Ts,t (j) − PtCs,t (j)), (2)
where Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, Bs,t (j) denote nominal riskless government bonds
carried over from period t − 1 and paying one unit of num´ eraire in period t, Rt denotes
the gross nominal interest rate on bonds purchased in period t, Zs,t (j) is the share in
the proﬁts of intermediate goods ﬁrms, Ts,t (j) denote nominal lump-sum net taxes. For
2The role of monetary aggregates in a dynamic stochastic New Keynesian model with olg is discussed
in Piergallini (2006).
3This feature of the model provides an analytically tractable way to introduce a ‘cost-push’ shock on
inﬂation (e.g., Clarida et al., 2002).
2analytical convenience, proﬁt shares and lump-sum net taxes are age-independent and
newly born agents do not hold any ﬁnancial assets.
To obtain a tractable solution, we focus on the following period utility function:4
U (Cs,t (j),Ns,t (j)) ≡ log[Cs,t (j) − V (Ns,t (j))], (3)
where the function V (•) is such that V ′ (•),V ′′ (•) > 0. Solving the individual maximiz-
ing problem and aggregating over all generations alive, where the aggregate value Xt of
a generic economic variable Xs,t is deﬁned as Xt ≡
 t
s=−∞






= Bt + WtNt + Zt − Tt − PtCt, (4)
PtΩt = Ψ
 
Bt + Ht − Et
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where Ψ ≡ [1 − β (1 − γ)], Qt,T is the relevant stochastic discount factor, Ωt ≡ [Ct − V (Nt)]
is aggregate consumption net of its subsistence level (see Ascari and Rankin, 2006),
Ht ≡ Et
 ∞
T=t Qt,T (1 − γ)
T−t (WTNT + ZT − TT) is aggregate human wealth, and uw
t =
1/(ηt − 1) is the exogenous optimal wage mark-up. Given equations (4) and (5) and







β (1 − γ)
Et {Qt,t+1Bt+1}. (7)
The time path of adjusted consumption is aﬀected by the level of ﬁnancial wealth.
2.2 Firms
The supply-side of the economy is described by a continuum of monopolistic ﬁrms, in-
dexed by i, each producing a variety i of the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods and setting
prices in a staggered fashion. All intermediate goods are employed as inputs by perfectly
competitive ﬁrms producing the single ﬁnal good.
The ﬁnal good representative ﬁrm faces a ces technology, Yt =





where Yt denotes aggregate output and Ξt (i) is the quantity of intermediate good pro-
duced by ﬁrm i. Proﬁt maximization yields the demand for each intermediate good i as
a function of the relative price of i and of total production, Ξt (i) = (Pt (i)/Pt)
−ε Yt. In
addition, the zero proﬁt condition implies Pt =





Each intermediate good producer faces a linear production function, Yt (i) = Nt (i),
where Nt (i) =




represents labor services used by ﬁrm i.5
4Ascari and Rankin (2006) provide strong reasons to prefer this family of utility functions in olg
models with endogenous labor supply. They show that the present preferences’ speciﬁcation removes
a negative labor supply problem which may arise for older generations in models ` a la Yaari-Blanchard
with leisure in the utility function when leisure is a normal good.
5For simplicity, we have normalized the level of labor productivity to one.
3The nominal marginal cost, MCn
t , is given by the wage rate Wt and thus is identical across
ﬁrms. Following Calvo (1983), each period a ﬁrm keeps its price ﬁxed with probability
θ. Hence Pt =
  t
s=−∞ (1 − θ)θ
t−sΛs
1−ε 1/(1−ε)
, where Λs denotes the price set by ﬁrms
able to revise their pricing decisions in period s. At the optimum Λt is equal to a mark-up







T [Λt − (1 + u
p)MC
n
T] = 0, (8)
where up = 1/(ε − 1) is the net mark-up. At the symmetric equilibrium the price index








2.3 The Public Sector
The government issues nominal debt in the form of interest-bearing bonds Bt. For the
sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we set the level of public expenditure to
zero. Thus, the ﬂow budget constraint of the government in nominal terms is given by
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt − Tt. (9)
The solvency condition requires that lim
T→∞
Et {Qt,TBT} = 0. We focus on a ﬁscal policy
regime which allows for non-zero secondary surpluses or deﬁcits of the kind prescribed
by the budget rules of the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union.
In particular, we follow Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000) and consider a budget rule
where the sequence of secondary surpluses, {St}
∞
t=0, is exogenous and bounded. Hence,
lump-sum net taxes are given by




Substituting (10) into the government’s ﬂow budget constraint (9) yields the following










t ≡ B0/R−1 −
 t
T=0 ST.
The monetary authorities adopt an interest rate feedback rule of Taylor’s type, where







where φπ is a non-negative parameter and R is the steady state gross nominal interest
rate equal to the real rate in a zero-inﬂation steady state.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market requires Yt (i) = Ξt (i), for all i ∈ [0,1], and Yt = Ct.
Equilibrium in the labor market implies Nt =
  1
0 Nt (i)di = Yt
  1
0 (Yt (i)/Yt)di. Hence,




a dispersion index of relative prices across ﬁrms.
43 Inﬂation Shocks and Equilibrium Dynamics
To investigate equilibrium dynamics under inﬂation shocks, we perform a ﬁrst-order log-
linear approximation of the global system around a non-stochastic steady state with zero
inﬂation and positive public debt. Letting xt be the log-deviation of a generic variable
Xt from its steady state value X, equilibrium dynamics can be shown to be described by
the following is equation and Phillips curve:
yt = −
1
σ (1 + λ)










Et {πt+1} + κyt + ut, (14)
where λ ≡ γΨRDn/(1 − γ)PΩ, σ ≡ [1 − V ′ (Y )]Y/Ω = Y/εΩ, κ ≡ εV ′′ (Y )Y (1 − θ)×
(R − θ)/[Rθ(ε − 1)], πt ≡ pt − pt−1 is the inﬂation rate, dt ≡ (dn
t − pt) is the end-
of-period real public debt, and ut ≡ [(1 − θ)(R − θ)/Rθ]uw
t is the source of inﬂation
shocks, assumed to obey a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, ut = ρuut−1+εu
t, being {εu
t}
a white noise and ρu ∈ [0,1). In the present optimizing framework with olg the current
level of ﬁnancial liabilities of the government is net wealth for the living generations.
Changes in the level of public debt in real terms tend to change the current level of
aggregate output into the same direction. It should be noted that in the limiting case
of the inﬁnitely-lived representative agent setup, where λ = 0, intergenerational wealth
eﬀects are not operative and equation (13) collapses into the standard New Keynesian is
equation. The end-of-period real public debt by deﬁnition evolves as follows:
dt = dt−1 − πt + ∆d
n
t , (15)
where the term ∆dn
t can be interpreted as a secondary deﬁcit disturbance, assumed to
be exogenous and bounded.
The structural equations (13) and (14) determine yt and πt conditional on the time
paths of both the real public debt, dt, and the nominal interest rate, rt. The latter is
implied by the log-linear version of the monetary policy rule (12):
rt = φππt. (16)
Monetary policy is ‘active’ (‘passive’) if and only if φπ > (<)1.
To study the dynamic properties of the model, we use the following deﬁnitions.
Definition 1. A rational-expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {yt,πt,dt,rt}
∞
t=0




and an initial value of ﬁnancial wealth d−1.
Definition 2. The model exhibits a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium
if the system composed of (13), (14), (15) and (16) has a unique bounded solution for
{yt,πt,dt,rt}
∞





We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The interest rate rule (16) implies a determinate rational-expectations
equilibrium for each value of the monetary policy response coeﬃcient φπ ≥ 0.
Proof: The system (13), (14), (15) and (16) can be written in matrix form as
5Et {xt+1} = Mxt + Qet, (17)
where the vector of endogenous variables is xt =
 
πt yt dt−1
 ′, the vector of exogenous























The system (17) is composed of two non-predetermined variables, πt and yt, and a prede-
termined one, dt−1. Following Blanchard and Khan (1980), there exists a unique stable
rational expectations solution if and only if matrix M has two eigenvalues outside the
unit circle and one eigenvalue inside the unit circle. The characteristic equation of matrix
M is of the form
P (µ) = µ
3 + M2µ
2 + M1µ + M0 = 0. (18)
where M0 = −detM = −
 









P(−1) = −1 + M2 − M1 + M0 (20)
= −
 
2(2 + λ)(1 + R) +








Conditions (19)-(21) are suﬃcient for equation (18) to have one root inside the unit circle
and two roots outside.6 ¥
Consistently with the results ﬁrst obtained by B´ enassy (2000, 2005), the so-called
‘Taylor principle’, φπ > 1, is not necessary to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. In a New
Keynesian framework with non-Ricardian consumers, interest rate rules that underreact
to inﬂation may well induce determinacy of equilibrium. An upward perturbation in
inﬂation over its steady state value implies a lower level of real ﬁnancial assets which
tends to reduce consumption through the net wealth eﬀect. Such a contractionary eﬀect
follows from the fact that inﬂation generates a redistribution of real wealth from current
to future generations, because the reduction in the real value of government liabilities
dampens the burden of future ﬁscal restrictions. Intergenerational wealth eﬀects work
as automatic stabilizers and make active interest rate rules unnecessary for equilibrium
determinacy. This feature of our framework allows us to analyze the eﬀects of inﬂation
shocks under both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ interest rate rules.
To study the impact of inﬂation shocks for alternative values of the monetary policy
coeﬃcient on inﬂation, we parameterize the model assuming that each period corresponds
to a quarter of year. We assume V (N) ≡ N1+ϕ/(1 + ϕ), where ϕ = V ′′ (N)N/V ′ (N)
is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. To make the argument as transparent as possible,
we calibrate the model along the lines of the existing literature. We set the steady state
public debt to gdp ratio at 0.6 at annual level, as in Benigno and Woodford (2003).
The steady state real interest rate is 0.0125, as in McCallum (2001). The persistence
6See Woodford (2003).
6of the inﬂation shock is set equal to ρu = 0.3. We calibrate the probability of death
between two consecutive periods at γ = 0.015. We set both the price mark-up up and the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity ϕ equal to 0.2, consistently with Gal´ ı et al. (2006). The
steady state fraction of time in employment is 1/3, according to the standard eight hours
working day. Finally, the probability of keeping the price ﬁxed between two consecutive
quarters is set at θ = 0.66, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Table 1 summarizes
the parametrization of the model and reports the implied parameter values.
Figure 1 plots the responses of the economy to a positive inﬂation shock for diﬀer-
ent values of the monetary policy coeﬃcient on inﬂation: φπ = 1.5, as in the Volcker-
Greenspan era (Taylor, 1993), φπ = 0.85, as in the pre-Volcker era in the U.S. (Taylor
1999), and φπ = 0, i.e. the case of a pure interest rate peg.
For an inﬂation coeﬃcient of φπ = 1.5 the real interest rate and output move in
opposite directions, consistently with the standard theory. However, a close inspection
of impulse response functions reveals that even a monetary policy rule that responds
to increases in inﬂation with a less than one-to-one increase in the nominal interest is
stabilizing, contrary to the predictions of the standard New Keynesian models in which
the equilibrium would be indeterminate. When the nominal interest rate is pegged at a
constant level, φπ = 0, following an inﬂation shock, both output and the real interest rate
decline signiﬁcantly on impact. At later stages inﬂationary shocks give rise to deﬂationary
eﬀects. For φπ = 0.85, as in the pre-Volker era, we observe similar dynamic responses to
a positive inﬂation shock, though, on impact, the contraction of output is larger while
the real interest rate decline is less sharp.
The intuition behind our results is the following. After an inﬂation shock, real wealth
of currently alive generations declines and output moves downwards. Inﬂation redis-
tributes resources from current to future generations, since the decline in the real value
of government liabilities reduces the tax load for yet unborn individuals. The presence
of wealth eﬀects in the is equation does enhance the stability of the system, making
the respect of the Taylor principle unnecessary in response to inﬂation shocks. When
the Taylor principle is not satisﬁed following a positive inﬂation shock, the negative ef-
fects on output still come about because wealth eﬀects tend to reduce aggregate demand
redistributing resources from currently alive to future generations. However, the accom-
modating monetary policy decelerates the process of adjustment. In such circumstances,
the more persistent negative eﬀects on output generated by the initial shock bring about
a deﬂationary adjustment path.
4 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated how the explicit consideration of wealth eﬀects in a baseline
New Keynesian model can explain the decrease in output in response to an inﬂation shock
in a way consistent with recent empirical evidence. Speciﬁcally, it has been shown that
under passive monetary policies, inﬂationary shocks generate persistent and negative
eﬀects on aggregate demand giving rise to a deﬂationary adjustment path. An increase
in inﬂation does not need to be counterbalanced by a more than proportional increase in
the nominal interest rate to ensure economic stability.
In conclusion, the results derived in this paper suggest a possible simple solution to
the seeming conﬂict between empirical evidence and the predictions of the existing New
Keynesian literature regarding the eﬀects of inﬂation shocks.
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Steady-state wage mark-up uw 0.02
Phillips curve parameter κ 0.016









































Figure 1: Dynamic Responses to a Unit Inﬂation Shock
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